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1 Introduction 
Legal scholars and researchers describe immigration detention as “deprivation of liberty under 
administrative law for reasons that are directly linked to the administration of immigration policies” 
(Cornelisse, Immigration Detention and Human Rights 6).1 Immigration detention is thus a form of 
administrative detention that, to the contrary of criminal incarceration, refers to deprivation of 
liberty ordered by the executive branch of government—rather than the judiciary—without charges 
or trial (ICJ 10). Immigration detention constitutes one of the permissible exceptions to the right to 
liberty under article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Under article 5(1)(f) 
the ECHR allows “the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view 
to deportation or extradition.”2 In this context it has been usually presented as an inevitable element 
of the policies aimed at enforcing the return of irregular migrants, in particular by preventing the 
non-citizen from absconding during the preparation of their removal (Silverman; Noll; Gibney). As 
a result, immigration detention should constitute a preventive measure that is by no means a 
punitive one.3 
The qualification of immigration detention as administrative has far reaching implications on 
the level of procedural protection offered to detainees. As noted above, administrative detention 
does not require charges or trial. In fact, the fair trial guarantees set out in or derived from article 6 
of the ECHR—such as presumption of innocence, personal hearing, right to legal advice and 
translation, time and facilities to prepare one’s defense, and the right to remain silent—are restricted 
to criminal law proceedings.4 Thus it may be convenient for states to label detention of penal nature 
as administrative in order to avoid respecting these safeguards.  
                                                
1 Immigration detention can be also defined as “deprivation of liberty of non-citizens because of their 
undocumented or irregular status,” see Global Detention Project, Glossary, 
 http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/resources/glossary.html. 
2 Two main kinds of immigration detention derive from this provision: pre-admission detention and pre-removal 
detention. Although this contribution will focus only on pre-removal detention, the terms “pre-removal 
detention” and “immigration detention” will be used interchangeably. 
3 By “preventive” it is understood that such a detention serves merely to prevent the person concerned from 
absconding during the preparation of their removal. The paper uses the terms “preventive”, “administrative” 
or “non-punitive” interchangeably to distinguish administrative detention from penal incarceration which 
pursues punitive objectives. 
4 Traditionally, under the ECHR, the due process guarantees under article 6 are restricted to civil disputes and 
criminal processes; the majority of administrative proceedings, including those concerning return and 
immigration detention, are excluded from the scope of guarantees under article 6, see ECtHR, Maaouia v. 
France, 39652/98, (October 5, 2000), para. 39–41. As a result, both European states and the EU legislation 
(the Returns Directive, see below) dealing with pre-removal detention provide for less guarantees than 
criminal detainees are entitled to under article 6. For a more in-depth discussion on the difference between 
guarantees afforded to immigration detainees and criminal detainees, see Izabella Majcher, "“Crimmigration” 
in the European Union through the Lens of Immigration Detention," Global Detention Project Working Paper 
No. 6, September 2013. Likewise, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) does not require a 
fully-fledged set of fair trial guarantees to be afforded to immigration detainees under the Returns Directive. 
In its ruling in the G and R case, the Luxembourg judges found that not every irregularity in the exercise of 
the rights of defence (such as the right to be heard) in an administrative procedure extending pre-removal 
detention will constitute infringement of those rights, see CJEU, M.G. and N.R., C-383/13 PPU, (September 
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In its jurisprudence on article 6, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recognized that 
states could easily avoid fair trial guarantees by defining an infraction or procedure as administrative 
rather than criminal in their domestic legislations (Engel § 81). It thus acknowledged that there might 
be proceedings that are formally administrative but that are in fact criminal in nature. In Engel v. the 
Netherlands, the Court established three criteria to distinguish criminal proceedings from 
administrative ones. These criteria are not cumulative but each of them may reveal the criminal 
nature of the proceedings at stake. Accordingly, the Court assesses the formal classification of the 
proceedings under domestic law, the nature of the offence, and the nature, severity, and purpose of 
the penalty (§ 81-82; Macaluso 252). This contribution will focus more specifically on the last Engel 
criterion (nature, severity, and purpose of the penalty) that has been considered as the most relevant 
one to determine the penal nature of a penalty. As regards the nature of a penalty, deprivation of 
liberty most easily represents the criminal character of a sanction.5 The severity of the penalty has 
been assessed through the maximum permissible length of detention, rather than the one actually 
imposed (Ezeh and Connors § 120 and 126-129). Finally, regarding the purpose, the Court found, in 
Öztürk v. Germany, that the “the purpose of the penalty, being both deterrent and punitive, [suffices] 
to show that the offence in question was, in terms of Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention, criminal in 
nature” (§ 53).6 Although the Court never acknowledged the penal nature of immigration detention, 
this paper will apply its line of reasoning in Engel by analogy to assess whether immigration 
detention may be considered as having a penal nature. 
 Several scholars using the theoretical framework of the “crimmigration system of control” 7 
have already highlighted a growing convergence between immigration and criminal law. This 
                                                                                                                                                       
10, 2013), para. 39 and 46. Arguably, the European Union Charter on Fundamental Rights may trigger 
changes in this double-standard practice, since the right to a fair trial under its article 47, to the contrary of 
article 6 of the ECHR, is not restricted to civil and criminal litigations, see Angela Ward et al., “Article 47: 
Right to an Effective Remedy,” in The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, ed. Steve Peers 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 1197–1275. 
5 According to the Court, “[in] a society subscribing to the rule of law, there belong to the ‘criminal’ sphere 
deprivations of liberty liable to be imposed as a punishment, except those which by their nature, duration, or 
manner of execution cannot be appreciably detrimental.” European Court of Human Rights, Öztürk v. 
Germany, 8544/79, (February 21, 1984), para. 82. 
6 Legal philosophy identifies deterrence (as the prevention of further crimes) and retribution (the moral 
principle of retaliation according to which bad deeds have to be negatively rewarded) as two main objectives 
or functions of penal detention (see i.e. André Kuhn and Joëlle Vuille, La justice pénale: Les sanctions selon les juges 
et selon l’opinion publique, Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, 2010, p. 23–25). Other functions 
such as incapacitation (which consist in neutralizing the threat represented by criminal offenders by isolating 
them in prisons) or, on a symbolic level, denunciation (expressing the society’s disapproval of the violation of 
law) have also been pointed out in the literature, see i.e. Malcom Feely and Jonathan Simon, "The New 
Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its Implications," Criminology, 30.4 (1992): 449-
474; Arjen Leerkes and Dennis Broeders, "A Case of Mixed Motives? Formal and Informal Functions of 
Administrative Immigration Detention," British Journal of Criminology, 50 (2010): 833. 
7 The term “crimmigration” was used for the first time by Juliet P. Stumpf, see Juliet P. Stumpf, “The 
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,” American University Law Review 56.2 (2006): 
367–419. See also Juliet P. Stumpf, “Social Control and Justice: Crimmigration in the Age of Fear: 
Introduction,” in Social Control and Justice: Crimmigration in the Age of Fear, ed. Maria João Guia, Maartje van der 
Woude, and Joanne van der Leun (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2013), 7–16, p. 8. Among 
many scholars who observed the convergence between criminal law and immigration law, without however 
explicitly referring to it as “crimmigration”, see Teresa A. Miller, “Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration 
Reforms and the New Penology,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 17 (2003): 611–66, p. 619; Daniel 
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approach can be more generally related to Foucault’s “techniques and rationalities of government”, 
defined as “all those more or less calculated and systematic ways of thinking and acting that aim to 
shape, regulate, or manage the comportment of others” (Inda and Dowling 2). Borrowing from 
Foucault, Simon developed the concept of “governing through crime” to describe the situation in 
which “crime and punishment become the occasion and institutional context for shaping the 
conducts of others” ("Governing Through Crime” 173). Applied to migration control, Miller used 
this concept to “characterize the recent trend to increasingly construct problems of regulation [of 
immigration] as problems of crime, and in so doing to make available a whole host of tools and 
techniques of criminal punishment that would otherwise be inappropriate and unavailable” (5).  
 Addressed extensively in the doctrine, the convergence between immigration and criminal 
law embraces two distinct developments. The first one, already amply scrutinized by scholars, is 
usually referred to as the “criminalization of immigration law”.8 It consists in the use of criminal law 
to sanction violations of (administrative) immigration law, the most radical form of which is 
punishing irregular stay with imprisonment.9 This paper will, however, focus on a second facet of 
crimmigration, understood as the incorporation of “greater criminal punitiveness” in the formally 
administrative regulation of migration through the adoption of techniques, mechanisms, practices, 
and priorities of the criminal law enforcement (Miller 619). This trend has usually been illustrated 
through the case of deportation with several scholars already stressing that formally administrative 
removal may pursue criminal law objectives and thus be punitive in practice (Barnes; Pauw; 
Kanstroom, "Deportation, Social Control and Punishment). While Mary Bosworth considers that 
immigration detention was a particularly interesting domain to explore this trend (“Subjectivity and 
Identity in Detention” 125), she also notes that surprisingly few contributions had taken this 
direction since Simon’s work on “Refugees in a Carceral Age” (“Foreigners in a Carceral Age” 102).  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Kanstroom, “Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th ‘Pale of 
Law,’” North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 29 (2004): 639–70, p. 653–655; 
Stephen H. Legomsky, “The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice 
Norms,” Washington and Lee Law Review 64 (2007): 469–528, p. 471-472; Jennifer M. Chacón, “Managing 
Migration Through Crime,” Columbia Law Review Sidebar 109 (2009): 135–48, p. 135–136. 
8 See for example Jennifer M. Chacón, “Managing Migration through Crime,” Columbia Law Review Sidebar 109 
(2009): 135–48; Ana Aliverti, “Making People Criminal: The role of criminal law in immigration 
enforcement,” Theoretical Criminology (2012): 417–434. 
9 Interestingly–and in contrast with its implications on the second facet of crimmigration addressed in this 
paper–the EU pre-removal detention framework appears to restrict the scope of this trend to some extent. 
The interpretation by the Court of Justice of the EU of the Returns Directive (see below) suggests the 
Directive provides for some limits on states’ prerogatives to punish status-related offences with 
imprisonment. Although in principle criminal legislation falls under the scope of the states’ competence, 
domestic penal provisions must not jeopardize the achievement of the objectives pursued by EU law. On this 
basis, the Luxembourg judges found in El Dridi (CJEU, Hassen El Dridi Alias Soufi Karim, C-61/11 PPU, 
(April 28, 2011), para. 58–59 and 63.) and Achughbabian (CJEU, Alexandre Achughbabian, C-329/11, (December 
6, 2011), para. 39, 45 and 51.) that imprisonment for the failure to comply voluntarily with the return decision 
or for irregular stay itself—imposed during or prior to return proceedings—is not compatible with the 
Returns Directive because criminal prosecution leading to imprisonment would delay removal. While 
laudable, these rulings only have a limited impact on the criminalization of migration in the EU because states 
are free to impose a sentence of imprisonment if removal has failed. See also on this subject Valsamis 
Mitsilegas, “The Changing Landscape of the Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: The Protective Function 
of European Union Law,” in Social Control and Justice: Crimmigration in the Age of Fear, ed. Maria João Guia, 
Maartje van der Woude, and Joanne van der Leun (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2013), 87–
113, p. 98–110. 
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The few existing contributions rely on two main methods to stress the punitive character of 
immigration detention. The first consists in the analysis of the material conditions in places where 
migrants are detained and the way it is experienced by them. Relying on such data for the UK, 
Bosworth highlighted striking similarities between the conditions of detention, the staff, and the 
methods employed in penal jails and in immigration detention centers, reinforcing the 
interconnection between the criminal and immigration systems (“Immigration Detention in Britain” 
163). In a recent contribution addressing the US, García Hernández opted for another approach 
used by the Supreme Court to determine the penal purpose of a detention. Instead of focusing on 
the effect on immigration detention, this author analyzed the intent of the legislator in setting up an 
immigration detention regime. Since immigration detention became completely interrelated with the 
measures taken in the “war on drugs” during the 1980s and 1990s, he claims that the legislative 
intent behind the elaboration of the US detention regimes clearly demonstrates that immigration 
detention has been conceived and employed as a punitive instrument against non-citizens deemed as 
dangerous for society. Finally, Leerkes and Broeders have relied on evidence from both approaches 
in order to distinguish between the different functions assumed by immigration detention ("A Case 
of Mixed Motives?”). As they have observed, besides its explicit objective of enforcement of 
removals, immigration detention may also tacitly fulfill punitive functions, such as deterrence of 
would-be migrants, incapacitation of irregular migrants committing (petty) crimes, and denunciation by 
symbolically reasserted state control.  
 This contribution will not focus on the effect of immigration detention by examining the 
conditions of detention and how detainees perceive them. Rather, it will adopt the approach 
developed by the European Court in the Engel case and apply its third Engel criterion––the nature, 
severity, and purpose of the penalty—to the immigration detention regime under the European 
Union (EU) and Swiss law. In order to do so, the paper will mainly focus on the grounds for 
detention, its maximum length, and the categories of people subject to this measure. As in the 
García Hernández’s contribution, it will also take into consideration the legislative intent behind the 
introduction and development of immigration detention. For the EU law, the paper will analyze the 
Return Directive that regulates pre-removal detention in the Schengen countries.10 The findings will 
be deepened by the assessment of the evolution of the domestic law in one specific country—
Switzerland.11 As it will be shown, the evolution of the legal framework on immigration detention 
since the 1980s, coupled with the debates in the Swiss parliament, provides meaningful insights into 
the objective pursued by immigration detention. This contribution will thus analyze the evolution of 
the provisions regulating pre-removal detention in the Federal Act on the temporary and permanent 
Stay of Foreigners (ASF) of 26 March 1931 and, following its complete revision, in the Federal Act 
on Foreign Nationals (FNA) of 16 December 2005. Besides the legal provisions, the paper will also 
examine the specific context and justifications that led to the evolution of these measures, as well as 
the Swiss Federal Court’s rulings.  
 Our analysis suggests that the European and Swiss legal framework may leave space for 
authorities to extend the use of pre-removal detention beyond non-punitive purpose. Formally, 
preventive detention is allowed not only in order to prevent absconding. Arguably, both the 
                                                
10 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, Official 
Journal of the European Union L 348, 24 December 2008, p. 98–107. The Returns Directive is applicable in 
all the EU countries except from the UK and Ireland, as well as in the Schengen Associate countries (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland).   
11 Although Switzerland is not part for the EU, it is subject both to the ECHR (ratified in 1974) and, as part 
of the Schengen agreement, to the ‘Return Directive’, that was transposed in the national law in 2010. 
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European and Swiss legislation fail to preclude that authorities rely on the penal function of 
deterrence in order to subject non-citizens to administrative orders and to enforce removals. 
Moreover, in the Swiss context, it can be demonstrated that the deterrent effect of immigration 
detention is used not only in relation to enforced removals, but also to deter unwanted foreigners 
from committing crimes. In this perspective, pre-removal detention should not be understood 
merely as an instrument of immigration control, but rather as a wider instrument of control of 
“undesirable foreigners”. The use of deprivation of liberty with the specific purpose of deterrence in 
order to control immigration but also, perhaps in a lesser extent, to control crimes, unveils the penal 
nature of immigration detention. The problem of using immigration detention for deterrence is that 
it entails much longer periods of detention and a broader use of detention than would be necessary 
to prevent concrete risk of absconding. Besides confirming the trends already highlighted in the 
literature on the convergence between immigration and criminal law, this conclusion calls, at a 
practical level, either for a limitation of the use of immigration detention to the objectives of 
preventing absconding or a recognition of the whole set of procedural guarantees typical for penal 
proceedings.  
 The structure of the article will follow three main grounds for justifying pre-removal 
detention under EU and Swiss law. First, the risk of absconding will be discussed. As it will be 
demonstrated, in Switzerland it was originally considered the only legitimate ground for detention 
that implies a relatively short period of detention and restricted categories of persons concerned. At 
the EU level it is argued that imprecise terms used in the legislation allow authorities to rely on this 
ground also for non-administrative purposes. Secondly, the focus will be placed on detention on 
account of the lack of cooperation of the migrants, as provided for both in Swiss and EU legislation. 
This ground may allow detention with a deterrent purpose in order to force cooperation and enforce 
immigration control. Thirdly, the last section will demonstrate that pre-removal detention may also 
in practice constitute a punitive instrument aimed at preventing crimes committed by “unwanted” 
migrants. The Returns Directive does not exclude the use of detention for public order objectives 
and the issues of crime control have been very present in the Swiss debates regarding immigration 
detention. The article will conclude with some recommendations in order to restrict the use of 
immigration detention to the administrative purpose of preventing removal or to increase the level 
of procedural guarantees.  
 
2 Detention as an administrative tool to prevent absconding  
Under international human rights law, pre-removal detention is bound by the principles of necessity 
and proportionality. As the case-law by the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) indicates, 
detention must be necessary to execute a removal order taking into account all circumstances of the 
particular case and proportionate to the ends sought by the authorities (A § 9(2); Danyal Shafiq § 
7(2)). In light of this interpretation, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) and 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants (SRHRM) reiterate that immigration 
detention should only be imposed as a last resort when there are no less coercive ways to achieve the 
State’s objectives (WGAD § 59; SRHRM § 68). In particular, the Special Rapporteur stressed that 
“[governments] have an obligation to establish a presumption in favor of liberty in national law, first 
consider alternative non-custodial measures, proceed to an individual assessment and choose the 
least intrusive or restrictive measure” (§ 68).12 
                                                
12 See also Ophelia Field and Alice Edwards, Alternatives to Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, Legal and 
Protection Policy Research Series, Geneva, UNHCR, 2006; Alice Edwards, Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty 
5	  
	  
 It can be argued that the principles of necessity and proportionality entail that the risk of 
absconding during return proceedings be the only reason justifying administrative pre-removal 
detention. Administrative—and thus preventive—detention would only aim at preventing the 
persons concerned from fleeing. Thus it would be imposed following the issue of a removal order 
and for the shortest period possible prior to removal. The absence of any punitive rationale would 
be confirmed by the fact that non-custodial measures have been assessed and discarded as 
insufficient to prevent absconding. Likewise, Cornelisse considers that the only legitimate aim of 
pre-removal detention is to enable the immigration authorities to carry out the removals. Pre-
removal detention would be unlawful when used for criminal purposes, for deterring other 
immigrants, or when deportation is impossible even if the impossibility of removal is due to the lack 
of cooperation on the part of the foreigner (“Detention of Foreigners” 212). The analysis of EU and 
Swiss legislation reveals that none of them definitively ensures that immigration detention remains a 
purely preventive measure justified on account of the risk of absconding. By using broad terms, the 
Returns Directive seems to fail to prevent the misuse of this generally accepted ground for pre-
removal detention. The analysis of the evolution of the Swiss legislation shows that this motive was 
originally the only ground justifying detention and that it is still present in the legislation. However, 
other motives suggesting punitive and disciplinary objectives were subsequently introduced.  
 
2.1 European Union  
The Returns Directive allows for the six-month detention of a non-citizen who is the subject of 
return procedures on account of a risk of absconding (articles 15(1)(a) and 15(5)). From the 
beginning of the negotiations on the Directive, the drafters considered the risk of absconding as a 
justification for pre-removal detention, in line with the principle of necessity. In fact, the European 
Commission stressed that detention should only be used where necessary to prevent the risk of 
absconding (Commission Staff Working Document 7). While under human rights law the risk of 
absconding is a justifiable ground for pre-removal detention, the principles of necessity and 
proportionality entail several conditions for a detention to be a measure of preventive and 
administrative character. Arguably, the Directive does not adequately ensure them.  
 First of all, a risk of absconding must truly exist in a given case. Yet, the Directive fails to lay 
down clear safeguards to preclude that authorities use an alleged risk of absconding as an alibi for 
systematically detaining people in return proceedings. First, the term is not defined in the Directive. 
The Directive merely describes it as “the existence of reasons in an individual case which are based 
on objective criteria defined by law to believe that a person under return procedures may abscond” 
(article 3(7)). In particular, the underlying concept—“objective criteria”—is to be defined at the 
domestic level. As a result, in some domestic systems the “objective criteria” are either not defined 
at all or not enumerated in an exhaustive manner.13 Such imprecise domestic provisions afford broad 
discretion to authorities in deciding whether a migrant displays a risk of absconding. It needs to be 
stressed that if the person concerned is not likely to abscond, then his detention is not necessary to 
                                                                                                                                                       
and Security of Person and 'Alternatives to Detention' of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless Persons and Other Migrants, 
Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Geneva, UNHCR, 2011.  
13 For instance, Greek Law No. 3907/2011 on the Establishment of Asylum Service and First Reception 
Service, article 18; Hungarian Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country 
Nationals, section 54; Slovak Act No. 404/2011 on the Stay of Aliens, article 88; Estonian Act on the 
Obligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry, section 7(2)(2)(8); Finnish Aliens Act No. 301/2004, section 
121.  
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carry out his removal. As a result, detention in such circumstances can hardly be said to pursue only 
preventive aims (Wilsher 110; Cole 1007). 
 In particular, to preclude such situations, there should be a safeguard against the 
presumption of risk of absconding on account of irregular status. The Directive’s preamble vaguely 
lays down such a presumption. It reminds states that “decisions taken under [the] Directive should 
be adopted on a case-by-case basis and based on objective criteria, implying that consideration 
should go beyond the mere fact of irregular stay” (preamble, §6). However, the non-binding nature 
of the preamble points to recommendation rather than an obligation for immigration authorities. As 
a result, in the legislation of several member states the “objective criteria” include irregular entry 
and/or irregular stay.14 The Directive’s failure to proscribe detention for the sole reason of irregular 
entry or stay is regrettable. Immigration detention imposed on account of solely irregular status may 
easily become automatic, thus breaching the principle of necessity. In particular, it may amount to a 
disincentive measure, aiming at deterring non-citizens from staying irregularly.15 
 The principles of necessity and proportionality also preclude the punitive use of immigration 
detention by requiring the assessment of less coercive measures before resorting to detention. This 
requirement was enshrined in the Commission’s original draft. Detention on account of a risk of 
absconding was justified “where it would not be sufficient to apply less coercive measures, such as 
regular reporting to the authorities, the deposit of a financial guarantee, the handing over of 
documents, an obligation to stay at a designated place or other measures to prevent that risk” 
(European Commission, Proposal for a Directive § 14(1)). Following the negotiations, the language of 
the final text became weaker. The Directive states that, “[unless] other sufficient but less coercive 
measures can be applied effectively in a specific case” (article 15(1)) states may impose detention. 
Unlike the Commission’s proposal, the Directive does not enumerate any alternatives to detention. 
The language suggests that the presumption in favor of liberty is not clearly laid down and, in 
practical terms, the Directive provides for a mere possibility of choosing less coercive measures. It 
ensues that where authorities have non-custodial measures at their disposal to prevent a risk of 
absconding, but nevertheless resort to detention, their objective goes beyond ensuring the non-
citizen’s presence at the removal. Arguably, detention in such cases may pursue other, not purely 
preventive or administrative objectives. 
 
2.2 Switzerland 
The risk of absconding was the only ground allowing for detention when “detention pending 
deportation” was originally introduced in the Swiss legislation in 1986.16 This article was the first 
administrative form of confinement that explicitly aimed at facilitating the removal of foreign 
nationals. It allowed the administrative authorities to detain for up to thirty days foreign nationals 
whose removal order was enforceable, if there was a strong presumption of absconding. It was 
introduced in the context of a debate regarding an increase in the number of asylum requests and 
                                                
14 For instance, Luxembourg Law on free movement of persons and immigration, article 111; Dutch Aliens 
Decree 2000, article 5(1)(b).  
15 See for instance, a last year UK government-sponsored campaign targeting irregular migrants. In fact 
London saw a few buses touring the city which displayed the message: “In the UK illegally? Go home or face 
arrest”, Matthew Taylor, “'Go home' campaign creating climate of fear, say rights groups,” The Guardian, 
September 8, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/08/go-home-climate-of-fear-rights-
groups (accessed August 25, 2013). 
16 Federal Act on the temporary and permanent Stay of Foreigners of 26 March 1931 (Status as of 26 June 
1986), article 14(2-3). 
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difficulties in enforcing removal orders. The maximum term of detention was subject to important 
debates in the Parliament. The majority of the Commission of the National Council examining the 
bill proposed to limit the maximum term of detention to ten days, in opposition to the initial 
proposal of thirty days from the Federal Council. Numerous voices were raised in the Parliament to 
oppose the power of administrative authorities to detain foreign nationals for a whole month for the 
sole reason that they did not want to return to their country of origin. However, the majority of the 
Parliament finally followed the Federal Council’s proposal on the argument that ten days might, in 
some cases, not be long enough to carry out the procedure of removals.17 We might consider that 
the possibility of detaining someone for thirty days is indeed already a harsh measure for enforcing 
an administrative decision. However, the fact that immigration detention was restricted to persons 
having received a legally enforceable removal order, for a period not exceeding a month, on the sole 
ground of concrete risk of absconding suggests that “detention pending deportation” was originally 
conceived as a way of securing the presence of persons ready to be deported. The title of the 
provision itself, as well as the context of the debate from which these measures departed, also 
indicate that immigration detention was then merely thought of as a “practical solution” to facilitate 
the removal of rejected asylum seekers by securing their presence once their removals were about to 
be enforced. When detention is ordered to secure the presence of a person, whose removal is about 
to be enforced, for a relatively short period of time, one may conclude that immigration detention is 
indeed conceived as an “administrative means” of enforcing immigration control by preventing 
absconding.  
 Some elements mitigate this first conclusion. First, the Swiss legislation like its EU 
counterpart did not—neither at the time when detention pending deportation was introduced, nor 
ever since—enumerate “specific indications” in an exhaustive way, leaving discretion to the 
authorities to find the risk of absconding in a broad range of circumstances. Moreover, the Swiss 
legal framework never required the authorities to consider alternatives enabling them to prevent 
absconding on a case-by-case basis before ordering detention. This lack of consideration of 
alternatives to detention suggests that other purposes these alternatives cannot fulfill may well be 
pursued by immigration detention.18 
 As it will be demonstrated in the following section, the modifications made in the Swiss 
legislation during the 1990s and 2000s clearly suggest that immigration detention is no longer 
conceived as a way of solely preventing absconding of foreigners who could be deported but is also 
aimed at forcing foreigners into cooperation when removal cannot not be otherwise enforced. This 
evolution is also reflected at the EU level. As a result of negotiations, the final text of the Returns 
Directive also incorporated grounds for detention explicitly directed toward the lack of cooperation 
of foreign nationals.   
 
 
3 Detention as a disciplinary tool to force cooperation 
 
As shown in the previous section, absconding during return proceedings was initially considered the 
main obstacle to removal which could be overcome by the use of detention. The risk of absconding 
is still the most commonly accepted ground for pre-removal detention. However, the lack of 
cooperation during the removal procedure, but also—as will be shown in the Swiss case—during the 
                                                
17 See the debates on the article 14(2-3) in the National Council, the 19 March 1986 (BO 1986 337-339). URL: 
http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.do?id=20014173, last consultation 2 June 2016.  
18 For a more extended version of this argument see Clément de Senarclens, “State reluctance to use 
alternatives to detention,” Forced Migration Review 44 (2013): 60-62. 
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asylum process, came to be seen as another problem that pre-removal detention aims to solve. Both 
EU and Swiss legislation allow for the detention of non-citizens who allegedly do not cooperate with 
the immigration authorities. Arguably, such detention amounts to a disciplinary tool aimed at 
coercing migrants to accept removal decisions and cooperate with authorities to this end. At the 
same time, the detention of persons perceived as non-cooperative may resemble a punitive form of 
incarceration that punishes and deters such undesirable behavior. 
 
3.1 European Union  
Under the Returns Directive, states may impose a detention up to six months in cases where the 
person concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process (article 
15(1)(b)). Unlike the risk of absconding, this ground was not set forth in the original proposal for 
the Directive but was inserted in the course of negotiations. The Directive does not explain at all 
what actions may amount to “avoidance” and “hampering” of return. Arguably, if a non-citizen 
displays a risk of fleeing, logically he avoids and hampers his removal. Thus the question arises why 
this second ground was added. Presumably, it is supposed to cover cases where the person 
concerned is not willing or capable of absconding but nevertheless authorities characterize their 
behavior as avoiding or hampering return, such as self-injury in order to be taken to hospital or 
refusal to border the plane. Although detention on this account still aims to ensure successful 
removal, it also includes retributive elements. It may amount to a sanction to reprimand and deter 
such non-cooperative behavior (Wilsher 153 and 193). 
 In the course of negotiations on the Directive, non-cooperative behavior was also inserted in 
the text as a justification for the extension of the initial six-month detention. As a result, the 
Directive allows states to prolong detention to up to eighteen months when, regardless of all their 
reasonable efforts, the removal operation is likely to last longer due to a lack of cooperation by the 
detainee or delays in obtaining the necessary documentation from third countries (article 15(6)). Like 
with hampering and avoiding return, the Directive does not establish what constitutes non-
cooperation, leaving it to the discretion of executive officers to assess it.19 Needless to say, such 
discretion may result in systematic detention for eighteen months. The extension of detention by a 
year due to a detainee’s presumed refusal to cooperate may resemble retribution and deterrence. The 
authorities may rely on this ground to punish the detainee for their allegedly non-cooperative 
behavior and to compel them to cooperate.  
 Moreover, it could be argued that the EU law falls short of adequately enshrining the 
ECHR’s safeguards against continued pre-removal detention. Under article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR, 
administrative pre-removal detention is justified only for as long as deportation proceedings are 
being conducted. In cases where expulsion is not feasible due to the detainee’s lack of cooperation 
or failure to issue travel documents by the destination countries, continued detention cannot be said 
to be effected with a view to deportation. According to the European Court, such situations lack a 
“realistic prospect of expulsion” and continued detention does not achieve immigration objectives, 
which makes it unlawful under the ECHR (Mikolenko § 64-65 and 68; Louled Massoud § 67, 69 and 
73-74). Similarly, the Directive lays down the concept of a “reasonable prospect of removal.” It 
provides that detention is no longer justified if a reasonable prospect of removal no longer exists 
                                                
19 As Wilsher argues, the non-compliance by the detainee with the obligation to cooperate should be defined 
as criminal offence subject to due process guarantees rather than be considered within the ambit of 
administrative detention. This would require clearer standards so that detainees would have certainty as to 
what is required. Courts could then determine whether a detainee has complied with the obligation and 
decide on the length of a sentence, Ibid., p. 67, 154-155 and 196. 
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(article 15(4)). However, under EU law this concept is read together with the maximum permissible 
length of detention. As interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), a 
reasonable prospect of removal means that removal can be carried out successfully within the 
eighteen-month period and such a prospect does not exist where it appears unlikely that the person 
concerned will be admitted to a third country within that period (Kadzoev § 67). Such blanket 
permission to continue detention as long as it does not exceed eighteen months tends to be 
inconsistent with the above-mentioned Strasbourg case law. Above all, however, it allows authorities 
to use extended detention as a disciplinary tool to force detainee cooperation.  
 
3.2 Switzerland 
The analysis of the introduction of similar grounds of detention in the particular case of Switzerland 
sheds light on the objectives pursued through these grounds. Lack of cooperation has also appeared 
as an explicit ground for detention in the Swiss legislation since 1995.20 As previously mentioned, 
when introduced in 1986, detention pending deportation could only be ordered for persons whose 
removal was enforceable on the ground of concrete risks of absconding. Major changes occurred in 
the Swiss legislation regarding immigration detention following the introduction of the Federal Act 
on Coercive Measures within immigration law (ACM) in 1995. As a result of these modifications, 
immigration detention no longer appears only as a mean of securing the presence of foreign 
nationals when the removal is about to be enforced, but also as a coercive instrument to submit 
asylum seekers to the administrative injunctions during their whole stay in Switzerland. Arguably, 
several provisions allow immigration authorities to use detention as a disciplinary tool, during (or 
even before) ongoing return proceedings.  
 The first element that suggests this change in the way in which the enforcement of removal 
is pursued consists in the title itself on the new set of “coercive measures” introduced within the 
Swiss immigration law. More concretely, the disciplinary rationality of immigration detention is 
revealed by the introduction of several grounds for detention related to a lack of collaboration 
during the asylum and/or removal procedure. The ACM of 1995 introduced a new article, entitled 
“detention in preparation for departure”.21 Under this new provision, detention could be ordered for 
up to three months against asylum seekers whose requests were still being processed, on several 
grounds related to their lack of cooperation: 
 
To facilitate the conduct of removal proceedings, the competent cantonal authority may 
detain a person who does not hold a short stay, residence or permanent residence permit, 
during the preparation of the decision on residence status for a maximum of three months if 
they: a) refuse during asylum or removal proceedings to disclose their identity, submit several applications for 
asylum using various identities or repeatedly fail to comply with a summons without sufficient reason or ignore 
other instructions issued by the authorities in the asylum procedure; (…) Article 13a(a), Federal Act on 
the temporary and permanent Stay of Foreigners of 26 March 1931 (Status as of 18 March 
1994). 
These exact same grounds for detention related to the lack of cooperation introduced in the Swiss 
legislation in 1995 are still present in the current FNA under art. 75(1)(a). This provision allowing 
                                                
20 Federal Act on the temporary and permanent Stay of Foreigners of 26 March 1931 (Status as of 18 March 
1994), article 13a and 13b. See further for a detailed analysis of these articles.  
21 Federal Act on the temporary and permanent Stay of Foreigners of 26 March 1931 (Status as of 18 March 
1994), article 13a. 
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for the detention of persons whose asylum procedure is still pending goes beyond what is permitted 
under the Returns Directive, as the detention of asylum seekers cannot be based on the Directive.  
 The grounds for detention related to a lack of cooperation were also introduced in the 
“detention pending deportation”, which then allowed “leaving the person concerned in detention if, 
based on Article 13a, they are already in detention; (…).” Moreover this measure was no longer 
restricted to persons whose removal order was legally enforceable, but could also be ordered in the 
case of asylum seekers whose appeal against a first instance decision was still pending22. Finally the 
maximum term of “detention pending deportation” was extended from thirty days to nine months, 
and could be cumulated with the detention in preparation for departure reaching a maximal term of 
twelve months.  
 The possibility of detaining foreign nationals whose removals are not yet legally enforceable 
(in the case of “detention pending deportation”) or have not even been pronounced (as in the case 
of “detention in preparation for departure”) shows that detention goes beyond the necessary and 
preventive measures aimed to ensure the presence of the person concerned for the removal. 
Moreover the grounds of detention related to the lack of collaboration indicate that immigration 
detention has become a disciplinary tool for forcing the cooperation of persons suspected as having 
no legitimate motives for seeking asylum in order to accelerate their removals. The extension of the 
maximum term of detention from one month to one year also goes in this exact same direction 
consisting in using immigration detention as a disciplinary tool in order to enforce removal.  
 The disciplinary purpose of immigration detention was further confirmed and reinforced by 
the introduction of the “coercive detention”  during the introduction of the FNA in 2005: 
If a person does not fulfill their duty to leave Switzerland by the appointed deadline and if 
the legally-enforceable removal or expulsion order cannot be enforced due to their personal 
conduct, they may be detained to ensure the duty to leave Switzerland is complied with (…). 
Coercive detention, article 78 §1, Federal Act on Foreign Nationals of 16 December 2005. 
 
This last measure explicitly shows that pre-removal detention in Switzerland may not be employed 
to secure the removal of persons who can be deported, but to force the cooperation of individuals 
who could not be deported without it.  
 During this introduction of the FNA in 2005, the maximum term of detention was once 
again extended up to twenty-four months23. This length was no longer considered as the time the 
administration would need to actually enforce the removal order, but as a means of pressure that 
would lead the foreigners to collaborate with the authorities in the removal procedure rather than 
staying in jail for such long time. A quote from the Federal Councillor Blocher, who was at the time 
the minister in charge of the Federal Office for Migration, makes this very clear. In spite of an 
official report commissioned by the Federal Parliament that demonstrated that the probability of 
enforcing the removal decreased with time of detention (Contrôle parlementaire de l'administration), 
the Minister Blocher justified the new extension of the maximum term of detention from twelve to 
twenty-four months stating that:  
The purpose of the exercise is not that they stay here until the end [of the maximum 
term of detention]. The goal is instead that they leave as soon as possible because 
                                                
22 Ibid, article 13b. 
23 Following the transposition of the Directive, Switzerland reduced the maximum term of detention to 18 
months by introducing in the article 79 the exact same wording as in the article 15(6) of the Return directive. 
Like the Directive, the FNA does not explain what such a lack of cooperation should involve, thus it leaves 
discretion to authorities to extend ongoing detention. 
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they know that otherwise they will be held for such a long period. Federal Councillor 
Blocher, National Council, 17 of March 2005, p. 377. 
 
In several judgments, the Swiss Federal Court confirmed the objective of coercive detention as a 
last-resort measure that can be used to force the cooperation of a person whose removal has not 
been possible without their consent. The Supreme Court also repeatedly alleged the conformity of 
“coercive detention” with the ECHR, but showed some hesitation in how to justify this conformity. 
In effect, in a first judgment of 2 April 2007, the Court states that its conformity did not rely as in 
the case of “detention in preparation for departure” or “detention pending deportation” on art. 
5(1)(f) (detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition), but on article 5(1)(b) of the ECHR allowing for the “detention of a person for non-
compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation 
prescribed by law” (Federal Court Decision 133 II 97). In a second step, the Court changed its mind 
and considered that the legality of coercive detention was relying on both subparagraphs (f) and (b) 
of the article 5(1) (Federal Court Decision 134 I 92, 134 II 201, 135 II 105). In the judgment of 7 
July 2007, the Court confirmed the legality of the prolongation of coercive detention after thirteen 
months, even if the person concerned claimed they would never cooperate with their own removal 
even if the detention lasted another year. The explicit refusal to collaborate shall not, according to 
the Court, be taken as a reason to suspend detention since the lack of cooperation is indeed the 
reason for detaining them. This line of argumentation shows that pre-removal detention is no longer 
conceived merely as a means of preventing the absconding of a foreign national whose removal is 
possible, but also as an attempt to enforce the removals of foreigners where it is impossible due to 
their lack of cooperation. The alleged conformity of this purpose with the ECHR contradicts the 
stance by Cornelisse that detention became unlawful under article 5(1)(f) in the case where 
deportation is impossible even “if the impossibility of removal is due to the lack of cooperation on 
the part of the foreigner” (“Detention of Foreigners” 212). This body of evidence proves that in 
addition to its initial purpose of preventing absconding, a disciplinary purpose pervades the way in 
which immigration detention has been conceived and elaborated in Switzerland.  
 
 
4 Detention as a punitive tool to protect public order 
 
As discussed above, detention under EU and Swiss law may constitute a disciplinary means of 
migration control. This section will demonstrate that under both legislations, detention may also 
amount to a punitive instrument for crime control. The Returns Directive does not preclude 
resorting to pre-removal detention on account of threat to public order or public security. In the 
Swiss context, it appears that pre-removal detention is conceived as a tool for deterring asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants from committing crimes. In this respect, immigration detention serves 
to complement criminal laws that would not be severe enough to deter petty crimes committed by 
certain categories of migrants. 
 
4.1 European Union  
Detention for security reasons is not explicitly permitted under the Directive. This is not an 
incidental omission, rather a decision taken by the drafters. Already, the original proposal did not 
contain public order justification for pre-removal detention. It was the European Parliament that 
proposed a proven threat to public order, public security, or national security as a ground for pre-
removal detention (§ 55). Yet, following the negotiations, it was not inserted into the final text. As a 
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European Commission officer proudly explained, the Commission convinced its co-negotiators that 
pre-removal detention aims at ensuring the returnee does not abscond during return proceeding and 
not at protecting society from persons posing a threat to public order. In particular, “[the]—
perfectly legitimate–—aim to “protect society” should rather be addressed by other pieces of 
legislation, in particular criminal law, criminal administrative law, and legislation covering the ending 
of legal stays for public order reasons” (Lutz 69). While the absence of explicit grounds for pre-
removal detention on account of public order is welcome, some of the Directive’s provisions 
mitigate the positive outcome of negotiations. First and foremost, the grounds for detention are not 
listed in an exhaustive manner, thus in practice, states are not prevented from imposing pre-removal 
detention on account of public order. As noted above, states are free to establish the “objective 
criteria” for finding a risk of absconding in their legislation. As a result, several domestic legislations 
provide for criteria related to public order or public security, such as threat to public order, 
(previous) violations of public order or (previous) convictions.24 It is difficult to ascertain a direct 
link between these criteria and the risk that the non-citizens abscond. It appears that these countries 
make use of immigration detention for purposes not related to enforcement of immigration 
legislation. 
 Nonetheless, the possibility for states to detain on account of threat to public order has been 
circumscribed to some extend by the CJEU. One of the questions addressed to the Luxembourg 
judges in the Kadzoev case was whether the Directive allows states not to release the detainee, when 
the Directive’s maximum period of detention has expired, on the grounds that they have no valid 
documents, their conduct is aggressive, or that they have no means of supporting themselves. The 
Court responded in the negative. It pointed to the Directive’s text which does not allow the 
maximum eighteen-month period to be exceeded. More importantly, the Court also noted that 
“[the] possibility of detaining a person on grounds of public order and public safety cannot be based 
on [the] Directive […]. None of the circumstances mentioned by the referring court can therefore 
constitute in itself a ground for detention under the provisions of that directive” (§ 68-71). The 
Kadzoev ruling is not free from ambiguities. However, it is submitted that the ruling may not have 
such far reaching consequences as to outlaw pre-removal detention on public order grounds, i.e. 
detention in situations where return proceedings are underway and where the person concerned 
supposedly threatens public order.25 It has to be borne in mind that in the Kadzoev case, the prospect 
of removal did not exist due to refusal of third countries to accept the detainee and the expiry of the 
Directive’s maximum permissible length of detention. Without return proceedings underway, his 
continued detention would be justified only by public order considerations. It is not clear whether 
the Court would reach the same conclusion if the return proceedings are still ongoing and detention 
has not yet reached the eighteen-month period. Thus, it appears that only detention that aims solely 
at the protection of public order, when there are no return proceedings underway, is not justified 
under the Directive. 
 
                                                
24 For instance, Bulgarian Law of the Foreigners, Latvia Immigration Law, Malta Regulations on Common 
Standards and Procedures for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals, Dutch Aliens Decree, 
Swedish Aliens Act, Norway Immigration Act. 
25 For a more optimistic reading of this judgment, see Galina Cornelisse, “Case C-357/09 PPU, Proceedings 
Concerning Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov), Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) of 30 November 2009,” Common Market Law Review 48.3 (2011): 925–45, p. 938-940. 
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4.2 Switzerland 
Prior to the Federal Act on Coercive Measures in immigration law (ACM) of 1995, the Federal Act 
on the temporary and permanent Stay of Foreigners (ASF) of 1931 already contained in its article 
14c a provision allowing for the “internment” of foreign nationals who could not be deported if they 
represented a threat to national security or a serious threat to public order. Internment thus clearly 
amounted to the incapacitation of foreign nationals who were considered to represent a threat but 
could not be deported. This provision was suppressed from the Swiss legislation with the 
introduction of the ACM in 1995 because it was not compatible with the article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR 
that allows the detention of persons “against whom action is being taken with a view to 
deportation”,. However, the coercive measures were reintroduced and allegedly made compatible 
with the ECHR by subsuming them into the overall objective of enforcement of removal.  
 The punitive nature of immigration detention may first be deduced from the particular 
context in which the changes regarding immigration detention occurred in the mid-1990s in 
Switzerland. The point of departure for these new measures was indeed clearly oriented by a debate 
related to the criminality of asylum seekers in relation to drug trafficking, against whom harsh 
measures needed to be urgently taken. The bill on ‘Coercive Measures in Immigration Law’ was 
elaborated as a political answer to the public debate, which took place in 1993, on the involvement 
of asylum seekers in criminal activities, and especially in drug trafficking26. The importance of these 
controversies was clearly stated in the bill, where the Federal Council states: “It is the controversies 
raised by the issue of asylum applicants guilty of offenses in connection with the drug scene that 
triggered the development of the present bill.”27  
The issue of the criminality of asylum seekers not only appears as a justification for new 
measures, but also emerges as a new ground for detention in the provisions that were finally 
adopted. Following the introduction of the coercive measure in immigration law, article 13a(e) ASF 
(concerning detention in preparation for departure) and article 13b(b) ASF (regarding detention 
pending deportation) allowed for the detention of persons who “seriously threaten other persons or 
considerably endanger the life and limb of other persons and are therefore being prosecuted or have 
been convicted.” These grounds are still present in the current FNA under articles 75(1)(g) and 
76(1)(b)(1). Moreover, following its introduction in 2005, a new ground for detention concerning 
foreigners convicted for felony was introduced for detention in preparation for departure (art. 
75(1)(h) FNA) and detention pending deportation (art. 76(1)(b)(1) FNA). 
 The introduction of security- and criminality-based grounds for immigration detention was 
strongly criticized by the MPs of left wings parties as being in clear contradiction with the ECHR 
mixing up immigration and criminal law objectives. However, the Federal Council followed by the 
majority of the Parliament, justified the introduction of these grounds and their compatibility with 
the European framework, claiming that introducing such grounds did not aim at fighting the 
criminality of certain categories of foreign nationals, but at increasing the means provided to 
administrative authorities for deporting persons whose presence was particularly problematic due to 
their involvement in criminal activities.  
                                                
26 These controversies emerged more precisely in relation to the particular case of the ‘open drug scenes’ in 
the city of Zürich, and the publication of statistics of the Zürich city police regarding the overrepresentation 
of asylum seekers in drug related offenses.  
27 Orginal quote: "Ce sont les polémiques suscitées par le problème des requérants d'asile coupables 
d'infractions en rapport avec les milieux de la drogue qui ont déclenché l'élaboration du présent projet de loi." 
Message from the Federal Council (1993: 317), Message supporting the Federal Law on Coercive Measures in 
Immigration Law of 22 December 1993, p.317 
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 While this rationale clearly appears as the major justification for the introduction of such 
grounds, it transpires from some declarations that immigration detention was also conceived as an 
instrument to deter asylum seekers and irregular migrants from committing crimes. This view is 
disclosed in several statements made by the Federal Council and by Members of Parliament, where 
criminal law is considered as not being harsh enough to deter these particular categories of migrants 
from committing crimes.  
 It is not possible to replace the criminal law or overcome the inefficiency of criminal 
sanctions by providing special provisions in immigration law. (...) But we should not 
delude ourselves: the small foreign criminals are not impressed by the repressive 
arsenal of our criminal code.28  
 
If once again the Federal Council denies that it is willing to use immigration law as a substitute for 
criminal law, it suggests, however, that measures have to be taken to compensate for the inefficiency 
of such a system in the case of foreign criminals. The necessity of using these measures to 
complement the penal code in the case of specific categories of migrants was also supported within 
the Parliament by the speaker of the Commission who stated that “the proposed measures relate 
exclusively to administrative sanctions, which will not in any way replace criminal law, but should 
complement it.”29 So migration detention is not only aimed at facilitating removal, but also serves as 
a means of deterring asylum seekers from committing crimes by providing authorities with 
administrative tools that are more flexible and more severe than the one existing in criminal law and 
that can be used for specific categories of foreign nationals. There are striking similarities between 
the context of the “war on drugs”—highlighted by García Hernández —in which the legal 
amendments related to immigration detention were made in the US, and the debate related to the 
“open drug scene” from which the modifications of immigration detention in Switzerland departed. 
These findings for the Swiss case confirm similar observations made by Leerkes and Broeders ("A 
Case of Mixed Motives?”) who argue that immigration detention tacitly aims at controlling (petty) 
crimes committed by asylum seekers and irregular migrants.  
As introduced at the start of this section, Switzerland has long been relying on the 
administrative detention of foreigners for national security reasons. The ECHR has lead the 
Swiss government to abandon this form of detention aimed at incapacitating foreign 
nationals who cannot be deported but who are considered as dangerous. However, evidence 
suggests that immigration detention is being employed to prevent petty crimes committed by 
asylum seekers and irregular migrants, which represent a much smaller threat than national 
security issues. The intrinsic combination of the objective of removal enforcement and the 
relatively implicit objective of deterring crimes makes it difficult to contest the lack of 
legitimacy in using immigration law in that respect. 
 
                                                
28 Orginal quote: "II n'est pas possible de remplacer le droit pénal ou de pallier l'inefficacité de sanctions 
pénales en prévoyant des états de fait spéciaux dans le droit des étrangers. (…) Mais il ne faut pas se faire 
d'illusions: les petits criminels étrangers ne se laissent guère impressionner par l'arsenal répressif de notre code 
pénal, " Message supporting the Federal Law on Coercive Measures in Immigration Law of 22 December 
1993, p. 311-312. 
29 Original quote: „Bei den vorgeschlagenen Massnahmen handelt es sich ausschliesslich um 
verwaltungsrechtliche Sanktionen, die in keiner Art und Weise das Straf recht ersetzen, sondern dieses 
allenfalls ergänzen sollen, “ T. Heberlein, speaker for the Commission, 2 March 1993, p.76. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
As Section 2 has demonstrated, human rights standards circumscribe pre-removal detention to an 
administrative and preventive measure. In line with the principles of necessity and proportionality 
and the preventive nature of administrative detention, immigration detention should only be used 
when necessary to prevent returnees from absconding where less coercive measures cannot be 
applied in specific case. It should also be ordered for the shortest period prior to removal. The 
Returns Directive appears to contain weak safeguards against the misuse of detention on account of 
risk of absconding. In particular, it does not preclude that the risk of absconding be deduced solely 
from the irregular status of the non-citizen. In practice, detention imposed on account of solely 
irregular status may amount to automatic detention aimed at deterrence. The introduction of pre-
removal detention in Switzerland in 1986 provides an example of the type of measure—regarding 
the ground for detention (concrete risk of absconding), its relatively short maximum term (thirty 
days) and the limited scope of the categories of persons concerned (persons with an enforceable 
order of removal)—restricted to the purpose of preventing absconding.  
 Section 3 has argued that formally administrative pre-removal detention under EU and Swiss 
legislation may be employed to deter non-citizens from refusing to cooperate with authorities for the 
purpose of return. In such cases, immigration detention amounts to a disciplinary tool used for 
migration control purposes. The disciplinary purpose of immigration detention can be deducted 
from grounds for ordering (avoiding or hampering the preparation of the return or the removal 
process) and extending (lack of cooperation) pre-removal detention under the Returns Directive, as 
well as from its maximal permitted length. Such punitive purposes are even more apparent when 
looking at the evolution of the Swiss legislation, notably the titles of the measures introduced, their 
grounds, the increasing length of detention, as well as their justification in Parliament and by the 
Federal Court. This evidence suggests that pre-removal detention is increasingly used by 
governments as an apparatus for control aimed at coercing asylum seekers and irregular migrants to 
collaborate, where removal would be otherwise impossible.  
 Finally, section 4 has demonstrated that pre-removal detention also fulfils security and crime 
control related objectives. The Returns Directive, although not laying it down explicitly, does not 
outlaw pre-removal detention ordered on account of threat to public order or security. In the case of 
Switzerland, our analysis suggests that besides its main objective of enforcing removals, the 
modification in the law concerning pre-removal detention was also motivated by the deterring effect 
it may have on asylum seekers and irregular migrants involved in petty criminality, in particular 
related to drug dealing. 
 Two interrelated implications may be drawn from the paper’s analysis. First, from a 
theoretical perspective, it shows that pre-removal detention under the EU and Swiss legislation may 
not only be employed as an administrative tool to prevent absconding. Rather, it may also include 
deterrent purposes that are traditionally restricted to (punitive) criminal sanction. Arguably, 
immigration detention should no longer be described as a merely administrative tool of immigration 
control. In fact, in practice it is often used as a deterrent to facilitate migration control. Secondly, the 
control of migrant populations is not only aimed at immigration control but also at crime control. 
Immigration detention thus constitutes a disciplinary and punitive instrument designed to shape the 
conduct of a category of migrants in terms of both immigration and crime control objectives. In that 
respect, it shall be considered not only as a measure to enforce removal but more generally as an 
apparatus designed to “discipline and punish” migrants considered “unwanted” while they cannot be 
expelled. “Unwanted migrants” are those who have no legal authorization to stay or persons who 
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received a removal order but also—in the Swiss case—asylum seekers, pending examination of their 
asylum request. These conclusions regarding the EU and Swiss immigration detention regimes 
support the observations put forwards by several scholars that immigration and criminal 
mechanisms and objectives become increasingly intertwined.  
 Secondly, in practice, immigration (administrative) detainees whose detention aims at 
deterrence or retribution, are in fact subjected to a punitive sanction, while being deprived of 
broader procedural guarantees that criminal detainees benefit from. To remedy this situation, pre-
removal detention should either be restricted to purely administrative measures, or its penal 
character should be explicitly acknowledged in order to afford stronger procedural protection to 
immigration detainees. With respect to the first option, several amendments to the Returns Directive 
would be needed in order for the detention it sanctions to remain a purely administrative and 
preventive measure. To this end, detention should be allowed only on the ground of the risk of 
absconding, which should be clearly defined and not be deduced from the irregular status of non-
citizen concerned. In terms of Swiss legislation, the legal basis of detention should not go beyond 
what was allowed under the Swiss legislation in 1986. Thus, the risk of absconding should be the 
only justification for pre-removal detention and criteria for assessing this risk should be exhaustively 
enumerated. Moreover, detention should only concern persons with an enforceable order of 
removal and should not exceed one month. Finally, legislation should ensure that detention be 
employed as a last-resort measure once other less coercive measures appear insufficient. If 
immigration detention were used as a purely administrative measure to prevent absconding, the 
authorities would be more inclined to replace it more often with less coercive and cheaper 
“alternatives to detention.” In its recent and long-awaited report on the implementation of the 
Directive, the European Commission did not propose any amendment (Communication from the 
Commission). Likewise, no amendments aiming to restrict the use of detention in Switzerland are 
foreseeable in the actual political context. Thus, the second above mentioned remedy could be 
imagined. Arguably, if the deterrence of non-cooperative behavior or punishment of public order 
threats by returnees are explicitly recognized as one of the objectives of immigration detention, 
detention on such grounds would shift to the penal area. Persons subject to this (punitive) sanction 
would benefit from broader procedural rights, such as a personal hearing, time and facilities to 
prepare one’s defense, and legal and linguistic assistance free of charge, when needed.  
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